Supreme Court Judgments: April to June 2026
This is not a summary. This is a deep dive into three constitution-defining judgments and three significant rulings, with the full legal context, the reasoning, the dissenting opinions where they existed, and the static syllabus topics each judgment connects to.
1. M.K. Ranjitsinh vs Union of India: The Fundamental Right Against Climate Change
Background: How environmental rights evolved under Article 21
The Supreme Court has expanded Article 21 through a series of judgments since the 1980s. The right to a clean environment was first recognised in the Dehradun Quarrying case (1983) and solidified in M.C. Mehta vs Union of India (1986). The Court held that the right to life includes the right to a wholesome environment. This was reinforced in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum (1996) which established the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle as part of Indian environmental law.
But none of these cases addressed climate change specifically. They addressed localised pollution: a quarry, a factory, a tanneries cluster. Climate change is different. It is diffuse. The emitter and the victim may be on different continents. Holding a specific entity liable for a specific climate harm is legally far more complex than shutting down a polluting factory.
The Paris Agreement (2015) , which India ratified in 2016, created international obligations but no domestic remedies. India submitted its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): reduce emissions intensity by 45 percent by 2030, achieve 50 percent non-fossil fuel electricity capacity, and reach net-zero by 2070. But no Indian law translated these commitments into enforceable rights. This is the gap that the Ranjitsinh petition sought to fill.
The case
A writ petition under Article 32 was filed by M.K. Ranjitsinh, a former bureaucrat and wildlife conservationist, joined by environmental organisations. The petition argued that the Indian government's inadequate action on climate change violates:
- Article 21 (right to life): rising temperatures, intensifying heatwaves, and increasingly frequent extreme weather events threaten the lives and livelihoods of Indian citizens
- Article 14 (right to equality): climate impacts disproportionately affect the poor, who lack the resources to adapt through air conditioning, insurance, or relocation
The petition cited specific data: India experienced its hottest March on record in 2026, with temperatures exceeding 45°C across northern and central India for seventeen consecutive days. Heat-related deaths had increased 55 percent over the previous decade. Cyclone frequency in the Arabian Sea had increased 52 percent since 2001.
What the Court held
A three-judge bench led by the Chief Justice delivered a unanimous judgment. The Court recognised a fundamental right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change under Articles 21 and 14.
The reasoning rested on three pillars:
| Pillar | Legal Basis | Application |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic environmental jurisprudence | Article 21 as interpreted in M.C. Mehta, Vellore Citizens, and the right to clean air and water | The Court extended the existing right to a clean environment to encompass freedom from climate harm, arguing that if a factory's pollution violates Article 21, then systemic carbon emissions that destabilise the entire climate system also violate Article 21 |
| Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties | Article 48A (State shall protect the environment) and Article 51A(g) (citizen's duty to protect the environment) | The Court read Articles 48A and 51A(g) together with Article 21, following the harmonisation principle established in Minerva Mills (1980). The DPSP and Fundamental Duty created a constitutional obligation. Article 21 provided the remedy |
| International obligations | The Paris Agreement (2015), ratified by India | The Court held that international commitments, while not directly enforceable, inform the interpretation of constitutional rights. The Paris Agreement's temperature targets and India's NDCs created a legitimate expectation of state action |
The Court issued three binding directions:
- The government must formulate a comprehensive climate adaptation law within eighteen months. This law must cover heatwave action plans, coastal zone regulation, water security, and agricultural adaptation
- Establish an independent Climate Commission, modelled on the Election Commission, with statutory powers to monitor government compliance with climate targets and to hear citizen complaints. The Commission's membership must include climate scientists, economists, and civil society representatives
- Mandate climate impact assessments for all infrastructure projects above a specified threshold, integrated into the existing Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process
The separation of powers question
The most legally significant aspect of this judgment is the Court's direction to the legislature to enact a law. Article 142 allows the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice. But can it direct Parliament to legislate? The conventional answer, established in Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India (1998) , is that Article 142 cannot be used to override statutory law. But the Court has previously directed the executive to frame guidelines in the absence of legislation (the Vishakha guidelines, 1997 , where the Court created legally binding sexual harassment guidelines that remained in force until Parliament passed the 2013 Act).
The Ranjitsinh judgment goes further. It does not create guidelines pending legislation. It directs the legislature to pass a law. This pushes the boundary of judicial review into legislative direction , a development that is almost certain to appear in Mains questions on separation of powers.
Prelims traps this judgment creates
| Statement | True or False |
|---|---|
| "The Supreme Court created a new fundamental right through a constitutional amendment" | False. The Court read the right into existing Article 21. No amendment was involved |
| "The right against climate change is based solely on Article 21" | False. It is based on Articles 21, 14, 48A, and 51A(g) read together |
| "The Court directed the government to ratify the Paris Agreement" | False. India ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016. The Court used the Agreement to interpret constitutional rights |
| "The Climate Commission was created by statute" | False. The Court directed the government to create it. The Commission does not yet exist |
2. Digital Personal Data Protection Act Review: The Consent and Exemption Judgment
Background: the long road to a data protection law
India's journey toward a data protection law began with the Puttaswamy judgment (2017) , where a nine-judge bench unanimously held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21. The Court directed the government to enact a data protection law. The Srikrishna Committee (2018) submitted a draft Personal Data Protection Bill. After multiple iterations, withdrawals, and a Joint Parliamentary Committee review, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) was passed.
The DPDP Act is India's first comprehensive data protection legislation. Its key provisions:
| Provision | What It Does |
|---|---|
| Section 4 | Defines grounds for processing personal data: consent or "legitimate uses" |
| Section 6 | Requires "specific, informed, and unconditional" consent from the data principal (the individual whose data is collected) |
| Section 9 | Grants data principals rights: access, correction, erasure, grievance redressal |
| Section 17 | Grants the central government power to exempt any government agency from the Act's provisions "in the interests of national security, public order, and sovereignty" |
| Section 18 | Establishes the Data Protection Board of India (DPBI) as the regulatory authority |
| Section 19 | The DPBI's composition, appointment, and removal are entirely under central government control |
The Act was criticised from the moment it was passed. Civil society organisations argued Section 17 created a surveillance state loophole. Legal scholars argued Section 19 violated the principle of institutional independence. Technology companies argued the Act's compliance burden would stifle innovation.
The case
Multiple writ petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the DPDP Act. The lead petition was filed by the Internet Freedom Foundation, joined by a coalition of digital rights organisations, journalists, and individual citizens. The petitions challenged three provisions:
- Section 17: The government exemption clause. The petitioners argued that allowing the government to exempt any agency from the entire Act, without judicial oversight or even ex-post review, violates Article 14 (arbitrary power) and Article 21 (right to privacy)
- Section 19: The composition of the Data Protection Board. All members are appointed by and removable by the central government. The Chairperson is a serving or retired bureaucrat. The petitioners argued this violates the principle of institutional independence, which the Supreme Court had affirmed in the NJAC judgment (2015) and Madras Bar Association vs Union of India (2014)
- Section 6: The consent framework. The petitioners argued that the Act's definition of consent as "specific, informed, and unconditional" was undermined by the "legitimate uses" provision in Section 4, which allowed data processing without consent for purposes defined by the government
What the Court held
A five-judge Constitution bench delivered the judgment, with a 4:1 majority on most issues. Justice K.V. Viswanathan wrote the majority opinion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna wrote a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion.
On Section 17 (Government Exemptions): The Court struck down the word "any" in Section 17(1) as unconstitutional. The government can exempt specific agencies for specific purposes. It cannot issue a blanket exemption that covers all government data processing. The exemption must be proportionate to the stated purpose (national security, public order). And it must be subject to periodic review by a parliamentary committee.
Justice Nagarathna, in her dissent, went further. She would have required the government to obtain prior judicial authorisation for any exemption, similar to the warrant requirement for surveillance under the Puttaswamy (2017) framework.
On Section 19 (Data Protection Board Independence): The Court held that the current composition, where all members are appointed and removable by the executive, fails the test of institutional independence. It directed the government to amend Section 19 within twelve months to ensure:
- The majority of Board members, including the Chairperson, are appointed by a committee comprising the Chief Justice of India (or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the CJI), the Leader of Opposition, and the Cabinet Secretary
- Members can only be removed through the same process as the Chief Election Commissioner: by the President on the recommendation of the Supreme Court after an inquiry
- The Board must have technical members (data scientists, cybersecurity experts) in addition to legal and administrative members
On Section 6 (Consent Framework): The majority upheld the Act's consent framework but read into it a requirement that consent must be specific, informed, granular, and revocable. This means:
- A data collector cannot bundle consent across multiple purposes. Consent for sharing location data is not consent for sharing financial data
- Consent once given can be withdrawn. The process for withdrawal must be as easy as the process for giving consent
- "Legitimate uses" under Section 4 cannot be used to bypass the consent requirement for core personal data
The dissent: Justice Nagarathna's privacy absolutism
Justice Nagarathna's dissent is significant because it stakes out a stronger position on digital privacy than the majority. She would have held that:
- Government data processing for non-national-security purposes must meet the same consent standards as private data processing
- The Data Protection Board must be entirely independent of the executive, not just majority-independent
- The Act should create a statutory tort of privacy violation, allowing citizens to sue the government for damages when their data is misused
Her dissent follows the intellectual tradition of her father, former Chief Justice E.S. Venkataramiah, who was known for strong civil liberties positions. The dissent is unlikely to become law but will be cited in future privacy litigation.
Prelims traps this judgment creates
| Statement | True or False |
|---|---|
| "The DPDP Act provides identical consent requirements for government and private entities" | False. Section 17 allows the government broader exemptions |
| "The Supreme Court struck down the DPDP Act as unconstitutional" | False. The Court upheld the Act but read down specific provisions and directed amendments |
| "The Data Protection Board members are appointed by an independent committee" | Partially true only after the government amends the Act. Currently, all members are appointed by the central government |
| "Consent under the DPDP Act, once given, cannot be withdrawn" | False. The Court specifically held that consent must be revocable |
3. State of Punjab vs Union of India: Fiscal Federalism and the Basic Structure
Background: the cess and surcharge problem
The Indian Constitution creates a structured system for sharing tax revenue between the Centre and the states. Article 270 mandates that all taxes in the Union List (income tax, corporation tax, customs, GST) are part of the divisible pool and must be shared with states. The Finance Commission, constituted every five years under Article 280, recommends the percentage of this pool that goes to states. The 15th Finance Commission recommended 41 percent for 2021-26.
But there is a constitutional loophole. Article 271 allows the Centre to levy a surcharge on any tax for a specific purpose. This surcharge goes entirely to the Centre. It is not part of the divisible pool. Similarly, a cess collected for a specific purpose (education cess, health cess, road cess) is retained by the Centre.
Over the past decade, the Centre has increasingly relied on cesses and surcharges to fund expenditure while keeping the divisible pool smaller. The numbers tell the story:
| Financial Year | Cesses and Surcharges as % of Gross Tax Revenue | Amount Retained by Centre (₹ lakh crore) |
|---|---|---|
| 2014-15 | 9.4% | 0.96 |
| 2019-20 | 14.8% | 2.98 |
| 2023-24 | 22.3% | 5.74 |
| 2025-26 | 28.1% | 8.92 |
The divisible pool shrank as a proportion of total revenue. States, which bear the constitutional responsibility for health, education, agriculture, and police, found their share of central taxes stagnant while the Centre's retained revenue from cesses and surcharges grew.
The case
The state of Punjab filed an original suit under Article 131 (Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction in disputes between states and the Centre or between states). Punjab was joined by Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Delhi as co-petitioners. Together, these states represented over 250 million people.
The legal argument was precise. The states did not challenge the Centre's power to levy cesses and surcharges. That power is expressly granted by Article 271. They challenged the systematic use of this power to fundamentally alter the fiscal balance between the Centre and the states. The argument: what is individually constitutional (each cess is valid) can become collectively unconstitutional when it destroys the federal structure.
What the Court held
A seven-judge bench delivered a unanimous judgment. The opinion was written by Justice Sanjiv Khanna. The Court did not strike down a single cess. It did not declare Article 271 unconstitutional. It held that the cumulative effect of the Centre's fiscal practices was to undermine fiscal federalism, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
The Court's reasoning:
-
Federalism is Basic Structure: The Constitution's federal character was held to be part of the Basic Structure in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and reaffirmed in S.R. Bommai (1994) . The federal structure includes fiscal federalism. A Centre that systematically starves states of revenue undermines the very purpose of a federal union
-
The distinction between tax and cess is not absolute: While Article 271 allows the Centre to levy a surcharge, the Court held that a surcharge must be temporary and purpose-specific. A surcharge that becomes permanent, or a cess that funds general expenditure rather than its stated purpose, is a colourable exercise of power that violates the federal structure
-
The Finance Commission is not a remedy for structural fiscal imbalance: The Finance Commission recommends the percentage of the divisible pool. It has no jurisdiction over cesses and surcharges. The Court held that the current system, where nearly 30 percent of tax revenue bypasses the Finance Commission entirely, defeats the constitutional purpose of Article 280
The Court issued three binding directions:
| Direction | Details | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Cap on cess and surcharge revenue | No more than 15 percent of gross tax revenue shall come from cesses and surcharges | Within three financial years |
| Quarterly reporting | The Centre must provide a quarterly statement to Parliament detailing cess and surcharge collections, expenditure from each, and the specific purpose for which each cess was levied | Immediate |
| Finance Commission reference | The next Finance Commission shall examine and recommend a framework for integrating cess and surcharge revenue into the divisible pool or capping it as a percentage of total revenue | The 16th Finance Commission's terms of reference must include this |
The dissent that was not: why this was a 7-0 judgment
The unanimity is the story. Fiscal federalism cases are usually contentious. The SGST compensation dispute (2022) between the Centre and states produced sharp divisions even within the GST Council, which is a cooperative federal institution. The fact that all seven judges agreed that the Centre's fiscal practices were undermining federalism signals a significant shift in the Court's approach to Centre-State financial relations.
Prelims traps this judgment creates
| Statement | True or False |
|---|---|
| "The Supreme Court struck down Article 271 as unconstitutional" | False. The Court upheld Article 271 but limited how it can be used |
| "Cess revenue is part of the divisible pool" | False. Cess revenue is retained by the Centre. This is the core of the dispute |
| "The Finance Commission determines cess distribution" | False. The Finance Commission has no jurisdiction over cesses. This is why the Court directed the next Finance Commission to take it up |
| "Fiscal federalism was held to be part of the Basic Structure in this judgment" | Misleading. It was held to be part of the Basic Structure in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and S.R. Bommai (1994). This judgment applied that principle to a specific fiscal practice |
Also noteworthy this quarter
| Case | Date | Key Holding | UPSC Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| In Re: Speedy Trial for MPs/MLAs | April 2026 | All High Courts to register suo moto cases for criminal trials pending against legislators for 5+ years. Special courts to be designated in each district | Judicial activism. Article 21 (right to speedy trial). Criminalisation of politics. Separation of powers (GS2) |
| ADR vs Union of India | May 2026 | Election Commission directed to publish booth-by-booth voter turnout data within 48 hours of polling. Form 17C data must be made public | Election transparency. Article 324. Free and fair elections as Basic Structure. Right to information (GS2) |
| Wildlife Trust of India vs Union of India | June 2026 | Stayed forest land diversion in Western Ghats for a railway project. Held that the Kasturirangan Committee recommendations cannot be bypassed through ad-hoc clearances | Forest conservation. Western Ghats ecology. Kasturirangan and Gadgil Committee reports. Sustainable development (GS3) |
Dive deeper into each case: M.K. Ranjitsinh: The right against climate change · DPDP Act Supreme Court review · Punjab fiscal federalism case